I. INTRODUCTION
There is a long tradition in macroeconomics of attributing the real effects of nominal demand shocks to nominal price stickiness. In this view, if there is no change in prices when nominal demand rises, then quantities must bear the burden of adjustment. Hence nominal price rigidity provides the friction needed for nominal demand shocks to be transmitted to the real economy.
Standard models of this transmission mechanism, such as Fischer [1977] and Taylor [1980] , are based on the assumption that each firm leaves its price unchanged for a fixed amount of time. The main reason for considering such time-dependent pricing rules is their analytic tractability. Constraining firms to adjust their prices at prespecified times both simplifies the derivation of equilibrium strategies and allows the use of powerful time series techniques to analyze aggregate dynamics. The main disadvantage of the timedependent approach is that between price adjustments firms are not allowed to respond even to extreme changes of circumstance. This makes it difficult to know whether the qualitative effects of money in these models are the result of nominal rigidities per se or of the exogenously imposed pattern of price changes.
An alternative approach to modeling price stickiness is to allow the price-setting decision to depend on the actual state of the 685 geometric reasoning to characterize the joint money-output-price process. Section IV addresses the contemporaneous relation between money and output. Section V establishes the existence of an empirical Phillips curve, and studies other features of the price process such as inflationary inertia. In Section VI we extend results of Caballero and Engel [1989] to rationalize an earlier assumption on the initial distribution of prices. Finally, Section VII discusses the sensitivity of the results to various alterations in the assumptions.
II. THE MODEL
We follow Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] in focusing on a monopolistically competitive economy with fixed costs of price adjustment. There is a continuum of price-setting firms indexed by i E (0,1]. Each firm treats the current level and future evolution of the price index as independent of its own pricing decisions. At all times t ? 0, the log of the price level, p (t), is determined as the simple geometric mean of individual nominal prices:
(1) p (t) = f pi (t) di.
The aggregate relationship between money, output, and prices is captured by the quantity equation: (2) m(t) =p(t) +y(t),
where m (t) denotes the log of the money supply and y(t) the log of output.
The final three components of the model are less standard and are given a fuller introduction below. The first assumption specifies the precise form of the monetary disturbance. The second assumption focuses on the pricing policies. The final assumption concerns the initial conditions.
The Money Supply Process
As in standard menu cost models, monetary disturbances are the only source of uncertainty.3 Previous theoretical work on the aggregate implications of fixed adjustment costs has focused exclusively on the case in which the state variable changes in only one direction. In this paper we provide a first approach to the case 686 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS with two-sided shocks. We make the strong assumption that increases and decreases in the money supply are equally likely. ASSUMPTION [1983] , the standard approach to state-dependent pricing is to consider a firm that pays an explicit real resource cost each time it changes its nominal price. We adopt this "menu cost" approach, viewing it as a valuable shortcut in deriving sensible state-dependent pricing strategies.
When it is costly to change nominal prices, the optimal pricing policy must balance the loss due to nonadjustment against the cost of changing price. In static menu cost models the cost of nonadjustment is often captured by a profit function that depends on a linear combination of real balances and the relative price:'
Here the level of real balances influences profits through its effect on the level of aggregate demand, while the relative price influences the division of aggregate demand among firms. Changes in the money supply affect profits directly through the level of real money balances and indirectly by inducing changes in relative prices. In order to reduce the number of state variables, we consider the special case in which the effect of a change in the money supply on the firm's profitability is independent of the aggregate price level. In the static models this assumption corresponds to setting b = 1 in equation (3). In this case the effect of money is the same whether it is transmitted through a change in real balances or through a change in the price level, thus removing the firm's need to keep track of the price level as an independent state variable. The firm's profits and pricing strategy depend only on its price relative to the money supply. It is convenient to define firm i's state as (4) at()-m (t) -pi (t), so that in the absence of price adjustment, increases in the money supply cause the state variable to increase.
Given that the firm's profitability depends only on ai, we may impose enough symmetry and regularity on the profit function that the firm finds it optimal to pursue a symmetric two-sided (s,S) policy. ASSUMPTION A2. Each firm adopts a symmetric two-sided (s,S) strategy in the state variable oti(t), adjusting it to zero each time I ai (t) I reaches S.
We do not pursue the issue of optimality here and instead regard this assumption as a simple state-dependent alternative to timedependent pricing rules.
While the reduction to a single state variable plays a valuable simplifying role, it can in fact be dispensed with. When real balances and relative prices influence profits separately, the price process will influence the firm's choice of strategies. Equilibrium requires consistency between the pricing strategies and price process to which they give rise. Although this is in general a difficult problem, the single state formulation points the way to an essentially identical model with two state variables. This extension is outlined in Section VII and is given a complete treatment in Caplin and Leahy [1991a].
The Initial Conditions
We close the model with a specific assumption on the initial distribution of prices across firms and the initial level of the money supply.
ASSUMPTION A3. Initial nominal prices satisfy

PA(O) = (2-i).
The initial money supply m(O) is a random variable distributed uniformly on (-S12, S12]. Assumption A3 implies that at time t = 0 the cai are distributed uniformly over an interval of length S which is randomly placed in the range (-S, S]. The most important feature of the assumption is that the initial distribution of nominal prices across firms is uniform on (-S12, S12]. Starting with the initial money supply uniform on (-S12, S12] merely serves to start output off in its long-run distribution, as shown in Section III.
To understand the value of this assumption, it is instructive to contrast it with the case in which the initial distribution of nominal prices across firms is triangular on (-S, S]. This cross-sectional distribution is appealing because over the long run, individual prices spend more time near the return point than near the adjustment barriers.5 The problem with the triangular distribution, however, is that as soon as there is a shock the distribution across firms is no longer triangular. For example, a reduction in the money supply will empty a region of the state space as the high cci firm is pulled below S. Further analysis then requires the consideration of other cross-sectional distributions, so that tracking the evolution of the economy becomes tremendously complicated. In contrast, we show below that our initial distribution has an invariance property which greatly simplifies aggregate dynamics.
There are two arguments that support Assumption A3 in addition to its analytic convenience. In Section VI we show that these initial conditions arise as a natural limit in a series of models with idiosyncratic as well as common shocks. Furthermore, in Section VII we use A3 as a stepping-stone in the study of arbitrary initial conditions.
III. THE MONEY-OUTPUT-PRICE PROCESS
In this section we provide a complete characterization of the joint money-output-price process. This characterization follows from one fundamental observation: with Assumption A3 the distribution of prices across firms remains forever uniform over an interval of length S.
To Proof. First, we show that at any given time t, the distribution of a (t) taken modulo S is uniform. The proof is completed by 
The distribution ofpi (O) (mod S) across firms is uniform by assumption. Equation (5) guarantees that this uniformity property is inherited by the distribution of xi(t), since the addition of the constant m(t) does not disturb uniformity modulo S.
To complete the proof, we show that at any given time t, no two firms' real prices differ by more than S: This holds by assumption when t = 0. The only time that the difference between two firms' prices alters is when one of them changes its price. But at these times one firm adjusts to xi(t) = 0, so that equation (6) continues to apply.
Q.E.D.
It is now straightforward to study the evolution of prices and output. From the quantity equation and the definitions of p(t) and a((t), it follows that output corresponds to the mean of the distribution of the (xi variables:
With Proposition 1 the mean is simply the midpoint. To follow the output process, it is sufficient to keep track of the midpoint of the "price-elevator," as in Figure II . Conversely, output is a sufficient statistic for the cross-sectional distribution of the state variables (i (t), and hence for the overall state of the economy.
While all prices are in the interior of the range (-S,S], changes in the money supply leave all nominal prices unchanged and feed directly into output. When output reaches S/2, the price elevator is at the top of the elevator shaft. Further increases in the money supply feed directly into prices and leave output unchanged, while decreases feed into output. When output is at -S/2, decreases in the money supply feed directly into prices, while
increases feed into output. Formally, these properties define output as a regulated version of the money process, in the sense of Harrison [1985] .6 PROPOSITION 2. Given the assumptions of Proposition 1, the output process is identical to the money process regulated at S/2 and -S/2.
Proof. It is immediate from Proposition 1 that y(t) is always in the range [-S12,S12]. We define functions u(t) and 1(t) as, respectively, the gross cumulative inflation and deflation in the aggregate price index up until time t. Note that u(t) and 1(t) are increasing functions, and they also inherit continuity from m(t). By the quantity equation,
y(t) = m(t) -p(t) = m(t) -u(t) + 1(t).
Finally, it follows from Proposition 1 and Assumption A2 that increases in u(t) require y(t) = S12. Similarly, 1(t) increases only when y(t) = -S/2. Hence, y(t) satisfies the conditions for a regulated process [Harrison, 1985, 
IV. THE INTERACTION OF MONEY AND OUTPUT
We now turn to the statistical properties of the model. We show that our model with state-dependent pricing strategies produces novel predictions concerning the impact of money on the economy. In contrast to the one-sided model, there is a systematic relationship between monetary shocks and output: the overall correlation of money and output is positive. In contrast to timedependent models, the effect of money on the economy is closely tied to the state of the economy, as reflected in the level of output. For example, monetary expansion is more effective in expanding output when output is currently low, while monetary contraction is more effective in reducing output when output is currently high. Harrison [1985, p. 90] . 8. Of course, addition of realistic elements such as idiosyncratic shocks and heterogeneity in menu costs and alternative price distributions will soften the boundary between inflationary and noninflationary states. We consider some of these elements in Section VII.
See
The relationship between output and the effects of monetary shocks follows directly from an analysis of an arbitrary path of the money supply. Figure III illustrates the paths of output associated with two different initial levels of output. The figure shows that for a given path of the money supply a higher level of initial output raises the entire path of output. The paths associated with different levels of initial output may join, but they can never cross. The figure also shows that the expected increment to output is a decreasing function of the current output level, so that money growth is less expansionary when output is already high. A higher initial output both increases the cumulative amount of inflation and reduces the amount of deflation. Geometrically, this corresponds to the declining distance between the output paths as time passes, so that an increase in initial output leads to a less than one-for-one increase in final output. These results are presented in Proposition 3.
It is useful to note that we lose no generality in fixing the initial time at zero in the study of all correlations since we have started the model with output in its long-run distribution. 
PROPOSITION 4. For all t ? 0 the conditional expectation of output, given initial output and the change in the money supply, Ejy(t) jy(0),4m(t) I is increasing in Am(t).
Proposition 4 allows an easy demonstration that the correlation between money and output is positive. PROPOSITION 
The correlation between money and output is positive:
p(y(t),4m(t)) > 0.
Proof. Since Ey(t) = EAm(t) = 0, cov (y(t),4m(t)) = Ey(t)Am(t) = E{Am(t) E{y(t)IAm(t)}}.
Note that E{y(t) Am(t)} is increasing in Am(t), since the result in Proposition 4 survives when we remove the conditioning on the initial level of output. In addition, as a direct consequence of the symmetry of the model, E{y(t) IAm(t) = 0} = 0. It follows that E{y(t) I Am(t)} has the sign of Am(t), establishing the result.
Q.E.D.
While the results in this section are derived for a very special model of state-dependent pricing, there is a general moral. Statedependent policies tend to produce state-dependence in the effect of macroeconomic shocks. Testing such models will require nonlinear estimation techniques in which the estimated parameters are allowed to depend on the state of the economy.
V. PRICES AND OUTPUT
In continuous time the price level increases only when output is at its maximum value. This is reminiscent of the old-style
Keynesian treatment of prices, with inflation occurring only at "full employment." Due to the accumulation of shocks, however, the discrete time data will not reveal such a simple relation. High net inflation over a discrete time period does not necessarily imply high output. For example, if money rises monotonically by some multiple of S and then falls by S, output will be at a minimum even though only price increases have been observed.
Once again, a probabilistic approach clarifies the issue. Proposition 6 establishes that the sign of the coefficient in a regression of 
VI. CONVERGENCE
In this section we provide some justification for the assumption that the ai(O) are distributed uniformly over an interval of length S. We show that this distribution arises as a natural limiting case in models with idiosyncratic as well as common shocks.
We introduce the idiosyncratic shock in a way that does not alter the economic environment from the individual firm's perspective. Let xi(t) be an idiosyncratic shock to the profits of firm i, and suppose that firms' profits depend on the new state variable zi(t):
Zi (t) -m (t) -Pi (t) + xi (t) .
We assume that all idiosyncratic shocks and the money process are independent, mean zero Brownian motions. We further assume that the infinitesimal variance of the idiosyncratic shocks is E2, and that of the money supply is c2 -E2. Standard results on the Brownian motion then ensure that the evolution of zi(t) does not depend on the variance of the idiosyncratic shock. We therefore assume that the firm's pricing policy is to adjust zi(t) to zero when it deviates by S, regardless of the size of the idiosyncratic shock.
We are interested in the long-run behavior of the distribution of the zi(t) across firms. In Proposition 7 we show that for small enough values of E the cross-sectional distribution of the zi(t) converges over time to a distribution arbitrarily close to a uniform distribution with support of length S.10 The proposition is proved in the Appendix. The demonstration of convergence follows from logic similar to that used in the proof of Proposition 1. There, in the absence of idiosyncratic shocks, uniformity of the distribution taken modulo S and a support of the distribution of length S were sufficient to prove the invariance property. To prove Proposition 7, we show that each of these observations has an analog in models with idiosyncratic shocks.
While it is no longer true that the distribution of the zi(t) taken modulo S is always uniform, the distribution of the zi(t)(mod S) does converge over time to the uniform distribution irrespective of the size of the idiosyncratic shock. This result follows directly from an adaptation of Theorem 1 of Caballero and Engel [1989, p. 14]. They show that in a one-sided (s,S) model the cross-sectional distribution approaches uniformity over (0,S] in the long run for all values of c. Our two-sided model taken modulo S is equivalent to their one-sided model. In both models all changes in price are of size S and are therefore irrelevant to the distribution taken modulo S.
In the absence of idiosyncratic shocks, the only force effecting 10. We use the variation norm to measure the distance between densities f and g,If%8 I (f(x) -g(x) dx.
the distance between nominal prices was price adjustment, which itself placed all firms within S of one another. While price adjustment still pulls firms together in the present case, the idiosyncratic shocks tend to pull them apart. We can no longer guarantee that all firms lie within a range S. Lemma 2 in the Appendix, however, shows that with a small enough idiosyncratic shock we can ensure that most of the time most of the firms lie within a range close to S. Lemma 2 points to an important source of nonneutrality in two-sided (sS) models. Since adjustment is to some point in the interior of the range of inaction, common shocks tend to group firms together. This suggests that the more important the common shock, the greater is the bunching and the greater is the nonneutrality of money."1
VII. RELAXING THE ASSUMPTIONS
We now consider the consequences of relaxing the assumptions of Section II. We show that many of the characteristics of the basic model survive in richer settings.
The Initial Conditions
When we allow for nonuniform price distributions, output is no longer a regulated Brownian motion, but is instead the sum of a regulated Brownian motion and an independent error term. Thus, alternative initial conditions simply add noise to the output dynamics.
To see this, first note that the assumption that the support of the initial distribution is of length S is innocuous. Without idiosyncratic shocks there is no force other than price adjustment that affects the difference between two firms' prices, and this always works to bring these prices within S of one another. After all firms have adjusted their price once, all the ai will always lie in an interval of length S.
We may now confine our attention to initial distributions on (O,S].'2 We wish to compare the output dynamics associated with 11. Our result is a limit result as the idiosyncratic shock is removed. The dynamic implications of two-sided (s,S) policies in the presence of both idiosyncratic and common shocks are studied in Bertola and Caballero [1990] .
12. Assuming that this distribution has all of its mass at a single point corresponds to a single firm following a two-sided (s,S) policy, so that the following results naturally apply to a representative agent model. an arbitrary initial distribution to the output dynamics under the uniform distribution.
Once again, a geometric approach is illuminating. Since both distributions have a support of length S, we may superimpose them in the elevator shaft of Figure I and analyze their evolution under a specific path of the money supply. Lety *(t) denote output with the new initial distribution, and let y(t) denote output under the uniform initial distribution. In each case output is equal to the mean value of the respective a distribution. While the distributions are in the interior of the shaft, money supply shocks affect y(t) and y *(t) equally. At the top and the bottom of the shaft price adjustment occurs. Price adjustment leaves y(t) constant, but changesy *(t) by rotating the distribution of prices.
Figure V illustrates output dynamics in the nonuniform case. The density of firms at prices inside the lift is represented by the amount of shading. At both times t and t' the price-lift is at the top of the shaft. The only difference is that the distribution has been rotated by an amount S/2 between t and t'. As a result, y *(t) has risen, while y(t) has remained at S/2.
In general, the difference between y(t) andy *(t) is a function of the amount by which the initial density has been rotated:
y *(t) -y(t) = f(r(t)).
Here the rotation is captured by the relative position of the firm initially at the base of the distribution, which we denote by r(t).
The next result formalizes the sense in which arbitrary initial distributions add noise toy(t). 
E{y(t)Am(t) J = E{ai(t)Am(t) J.
Hence the covariance between money and ai is the same as the covariance between money and output. We may therefore be able to calculate the covariance between money and output from firm data even though we are unable to characterize the output process.
Note that this approach can only work in the case with a single state variable. With two state variables one cannot escape the need to follow the entire distribution of prices over time, since this determines the evolution of the price level and hence influences the choice of strategies.
The Single State Variable
So far, we have avoided the potentially separate influence that real balances and relative prices may exert on the firm's pricing decision. Allowing m -p and pi -p to play distinct roles appears to require a fundamental change of perspective. We must now face head-on issues such as the determination of complex strategies in two state variables and the consistency between these strategies and the resulting price processes. Our single state model, however, provides a shortcut.
We first examine why the model as it stands is not well suited to the presence of two state variables. When a firm is only concerned with the future evolution of the money supply, the economy always looks the same at all points of price adjustment. The firm therefore chooses the same value of ai regardless of whether it is increasing or decreasing its price. But, with the firm interested in both the money supply and the price level, it no longer makes sense for the firm to choose the same value of aoi when increasing and decreasing its price, since in the former case the firm is expecting inflation, while in the latter deflation.
The simplest alteration in the basic model that incorporates these considerations is to assume a constant size of price adjust-702 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS ment, which we shall denote by D, and an initial distribution of prices that is uniform over an interval of length D. These amendments preserve the invariance property of the original model, and hence the simple characterization of the joint money-output-price process. The only difference from the earlier analysis is that the price-lift need not be half the length of the shaft, as illustrated in Figure VI .
These simple amendments are indeed consistent with a separate role for real balances and the relative price. This is confirmed in Caplin and Leahy [1991a]. Here we provide a sketch of the argument. Under general conditions the firm with the highest relative price, D/2 will be the first firm to lower its price. For any given beliefs concerning the probability law governing the future evolution of money and prices, there is a critical value of (m -p )* that will trigger this firm to adjust its price. Equilibrium requires only that expectations are rational and that the size of the price adjustment precisely equals D. The invariance property then ensures that all firms will act in an identical fashion when theirs is the highest relative price, while symmetry ensures that the same arguments apply for the firm with the lowest real price.
Thus, there is a substantively identical model consistent with real money balances and relative prices having separate influences on profits. In equilibrium, output is a regulated Brownian motion with range 2(m -p )*, and the price level is the difference between m and y. All the Propositions in Sections III-VI of the paper apply without alteration. Allowing for two state variables complicates the microeconomics, but leaves the macroeconomics intact. There are now two macroeconomic models with statedependent pricing with radically different implications for aggregate price inertia. In contrast to the symmetric two-sided (s,S) model considered here, money and output are unrelated in the one-sided model of Caplin and Spulber [1987] . It is remarkable that the presence or absence of neutrality hinges on such an apparently orthogonal issue as the one-sided or two-sided nature of the shocks. The basic difference is that in the two-sided model a prolonged fall in the money supply ensures that all firms will be in the lower half of the state space. In the one-sided story there is no pattern of monetary disturbances that coordinates prices in this way.
VIII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The model also shows that state-dependent pricing models imply aggregate dynamics very different from those encountered in time-dependent models. In time-dependent models, the evolution of output is often captured by an ARMA process in which the coefficients on the shocks are constant over time. With statedependent pricing the effect of money on output will depend on the state of the economy. In our model increases and decreases in the money supply have different effects depending on whether output is high or low. At higher output levels the expansionary effects of increases in the money supply are diminished, while the contractionary effects of decreases in money are enhanced.
The techniques and results of this paper can be developed in several directions. At a more general level our approach to dynamic macroeconomics discards the fiction of a representative agent. Instead, we view the economy as a collection of heterogeneous agents who allow their control variables to drift away from their optimal values. The important object of analysis is then the cross-sectional distribution of these control variables. In this paper we find conditions under
